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The Maturity Drivers of Corporate Capital 
Structure of Private/Unlisted Companies
Guido Max Mantovani
Ca’ Foscari University, Venice and Treviso
This paper investigates whether debt quality matters and the role of debt maturity choice. Shortening 
maturity incentivizes more liquid, less productive, investments and it increases the probability of default. 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of a sample of Italian unlisted companies between 2005 and 
2009. Two subsets are identified, controlling if companies disappeared in 2011. Comparing results from 
the two subsets we find: (i) proof of endogenous bankruptcy but generated by creditors; (ii) evidence of 
impacts from debt maturity on performance; (iii) significant relations between maturity and size; (iv) a 
specific contribution of debt maturity to the tax shield. 
INTRODUCTION
Leveraging is increasingly thought of as the devil. The high leveraging that has spread to all the areas 
of the economic system has contributed to the high volatility that underpins the years of the recent 
financial crisis. Thus, leverage reduction is commonly believed to be the unique solution to exiting the 
crisis. Corporations are no exception to this rule: high corporate leveraging generates bankruptcy 
procedures that have reduced economic welfare and generated further corporate distress through a 
stagnating loop. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been particularly hit by this loop as a 
consequence of their lower bargaining power in fund-raising transactions.
Leverage analysis is typically focused on the quantity of debt, whatever the framework of the 
analysis. At a more academic level, there is a need to understand both the absolute amount of debt capital 
raised and its level relative to equity capital. This approach aims to solve the capital structure puzzle. At a 
more practical level, however, the focus is on the methodology of leverage computation, i.e. whether to 
have recourse to book or market values. These being very different, the results derived from the two 
computational approaches may strongly bias any following decisions. In particular, the higher the 
goodwill embedded in equity market values, the wider the gap in the leverage ratios computed according 
to the two possible methodologies. The book value only methodology for computing leverage is 
particularly diffused in standard banking practices to determine the merit of SMEs in terms of credit. In 
the case of unlisted companies (as SMEs generally are), such an approach cannot be mitigated by the 
evidence from comparable market values of equity. This overestimates the leverage ratio and reduces 
capital attraction, while regulatory approaches such as the Basel II Accord and the forthcoming Basel III 
tend to exacerbate this bias. This status of artificial capital rationing generates a paradox: the stronger the 
constraint to adopt book values, the higher the computed leverage and the lower new capital allowances. 
Companies are then forced to restructure their liabilities by adding new equity and using flows to pay 
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back the existing debt rather than investing to improve corporate performance. In this way, (asset side) 
value creation is missed as the most powerful tool to control the leverage explosion!
This paper suggests that debt quality matters too and that debt maturity is one of the inner qualitative 
points of the capital structure analysis. At the corporate level, the maturity mismatch results in widespread 
unexpected risk. Shortening the maturity of financial liabilities incentivizes more liquid asset investments, 
usually those that are less productive. At the same time, the shorter the maturity of debt, the higher the 
probability of corporate default, given the duration of the assets. Since the seminal work of Modigliani 
and Miller (1958), the qualitative duration of debt has been neglected in favor of considering 
irredeemable debts (i.e., consols): debt is supposed to perpetuate according to the quality of assets. This 
means that the duration puzzle of the debt is supposed to be solved by financial markets through their 
perfect efficiency and completeness – very far away from true in the case of private companies, 
particularly SMEs. Even the best financial advisory practices are no exception to the above theoretical 
bias: both in the case of book value analysis, as the debt-to-equity ratio computation is usually not 
distinguished by debt maturity, and market value levels, as the practice of deleveraging beta usually 
supposes debt to be perpetual.
Only very recent approaches have demonstrated that by arranging the qualitative profiles of debts it is 
possible to relate the impact of debt maturity to corporate performance (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1991). 
Vice-versa, some drivers of corporate performance seem to impact maturity choices, as Guedes and Opler 
(1996) demonstrate for a wide range of bonds and notes. A seminal work by Leland and Toft (1996) rules 
out that debt maturity is a driver of the leverage puzzle due to “endogenous bankruptcy” (i.e., an agency 
approach to risk sharing). Hence, the two-fund separation theorem is overcome by considering debt 
quality through its maturity.
Leland and Toft’s (1996) approach is the starting point in this paper to gain a better understanding of 
whether: (i) there is a particular relationship between debt maturity and firm performance; (ii) SMEs have 
special requirements according to the qualitative profile of their financial debts; (iii) it is possible to 
increase competitive performance by adjusting the maturity of debt.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a review of the possible drivers of corporate debt 
maturity is presented according to the suggestions in the financial literature. Possible differences in 
corporate debt maturity characterizing SMEs are also focused on in this section. In section 3, a model 
based on Leland and Toft’s (1996) approach is proposed to capture the determinants of debt maturity in 
private unlisted companies, particularly SMEs. Section 4 deploys some empirical evidence from the 
Italian case, as the high density of fully private/unlisted SMEs makes Italy an optimal forum in which to 
test the model. Section 5 concludes by proposing improvements to financial practice and further research 
activities.
THE DEBT MATURITY PUZZLE: A LITERATURE REVIEW
The capital structure puzzle has been analyzed in considerable depth in the literature; the main focus 
has always been to discover the determinants of the debt-to-equity ratio. This focus has represented the 
strength of the research (being very practical), but at the same time is the source of its weakness (it does 
not consider the qualitative aspects of the puzzle). The maturity of debt is one of the topics analyzed most 
recently, both in terms of exogenous determinants such as the maturity structure of Government Bonds 
(see, e.g., Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein 2010), and in terms of endogenous drivers such as corporate 
risk, as shown by Leland and Toft (1996) in their seminal paper. The debt maturity puzzle is usually made 
up of four questions, each of which is addressed in turn below. 
RQ1: is there any special relationship between debt maturity and capital structure?
The initial question concerning debt maturity was posed by Flannery (1986). He finds that if capital 
market investors and firm insiders possess the same information about a company's prospects, its 
liabilities will be priced so that the firm is indifferent to the composition of its financial liabilities (at least 
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under certain, well-known circumstances). However, if firm insiders are systematically better informed 
than outside investors, they will choose to issue those types of securities with maturity that the markets 
overvalue the most.
The existence of the relation discussed here is initially considered in Leland (1994). He examines 
debt values and capital structure in a unified analytical framework and derives closed-form results for the 
value of long-term risky debt and for optimal capital structure. In particular, he develops an original 
closed-form solution for the value of debt and for optimal capital structure when the firm asset value 
follows a diffusion process with constant volatility. The results indicate that collateralized debt values and 
unprotected investment-grade debt values behave very close to what is expected by the model. 
Unprotected junk bonds exhibit quite different behavior. In this paper, Leland does not depict the 
endogenous bankruptcy model, even if his conclusions concerning bond protection are coherent with 
further papers proposing it. The complete model of endogenous bankruptcy is proposed in Leland and 
Toft (1996). In this article, they examine the optimal capital structure of a firm that can choose both the 
amount and maturity of its debt. Bankruptcy is determined endogenously. The paper develops a model of 
optimal leverage and risky corporate bond prices for arbitrary debt maturity. An empirical model is 
presented to support the theoretical premise. 
A possible evolution of the Leland and Toft (1996) model is presented by Hilberink and Rogers 
(2002). The authors aim to demonstrate that credit spreads do reach zero as maturity approaches zero; the 
results are consistent with suggestions from practice. They take Leland’s (1994) approach for a firm with 
a constant debt structure and extend it by incorporating downward jumps in the value of the firm’s assets. 
They find that the different behavior of the yield spreads at zero is the principal point of difference 
between Leland’s conclusion and theirs. The results are qualitatively similar, even if the authors use a 
“delicate” model without a specific panel of firms.
More recently, Chen and Kou (2009) have analyzed the endogenous bankruptcy puzzle and propose a 
two-sided jump model for credit risk by extending Leland’s original model. Their new model shows that 
jump risk and endogenous default can have a significant impact on credit spreads, optimal capital 
structure, and the implied volatility of equity options. The authors give a proof of a version of the smooth-
fitting principle under the jump model, justifying a conjecture first suggested by Leland and Toft (1996) 
under the Brownian motion.
RQ2: is there any particular link between debt maturity and operating performance?
Harris and Raviv (1991) present a deep and systematic analysis of the “state of the art” in the 
academic evolution of research concerning capital structure and the non-applicability of Modigliani and 
Miller’s (1958, 1963) approach. Harris and Raviv’s (1991) paper surveys capital structure theories based 
on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control 
considerations. The authors uncover the inner implications of the models surveyed, and all these results 
are collected and compared to the available evidence.
In Whited (1992), the possibility of specific behavior decisions for debt maturity are determined. The 
paper presents evidence that problems of asymmetric information in debt markets affect unhealthy firms’ 
ability to obtain outside finance, and consequently their allocation of real investment expenditure over 
time. Berens and Cuny (1995) point out that a firm’s value typically reflects its growing stream of 
earnings, while current debt reflects the non-growing stream of interest payments. A proof of this 
hypothesis can be found in the empirical analysis of their paper, which shows how nominal firm growth 
(i.e., inflation plus real growth) distorts the debt ratio and the measure of tax shielding.
The relation between business performance and debt maturity is examined in particular depth in 
Guedes and Opler (1996), who show that corporate performances impact maturity choices by analyzing a 
wide range of bonds and notes, and Ozkan (2000), who provides an empirical analysis of the determinants 
of a firm’s debt maturity structure for a sample of 429 UK firms. The evidence provided supports the 
hypothesis that firms with greater growth opportunities embedded in their investments tend to use short-
term debt. Furthermore, larger firms have more long-term debts. Less support is provided for the view 
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suggesting the use of corporate debt maturity to signal information to the market; there is no clear 
evidence for a negative correlation between taxes and debt maturity. The results also suggest that firms 
have long-term target ratios and adjust to the target ratio relatively fast. 
Yi (2005) suggests that firms need to choose both the debt-to-equity ratio and the maturity of their 
debts to achieve the optimal capital structure. In this paper, the author reviews the various theoretical and 
empirical studies related to debt maturity structure and classifies the theoretical models of debt maturity 
structure into four groups. He analyzes the relationship between debt maturity structure and other 
features, and he finds that only agency problems can be solved by maturity choices. Other puzzles, such 
as signaling effects, tax effects, and debt valuation, cannot be explained by maturity choices.
RQ3: does company size matter in the two previous relations?
Hoven-Stohs and Mauer (1996) propose an approach to debt maturity that differs from that of Leland 
and Toft (1996). They find that larger companies with less risky and longer maturity assets prefer use 
more long-term debt than others. There is an inverse relation between the effective tax rate and the 
maturity of the debt. An inverse relationship is even found between the unexpected events related to 
earnings and the maturity of the debt, as is clear evidence of the existence of an inverse relationship 
between the duration of debt and growth opportunities, with companies rated very high or very low using 
more short-term debt.
The issue of adverse selection is particularly analyzed in Goswami (2000). Although the research 
relates to larger companies rather than SMEs, it indicates the optimality of short-term financing as a 
vehicle for mitigating the adverse selection problem. The author considers the impact of information 
asymmetry regarding the maturity structure of cash flows on the debt maturity decision. He also shows 
that adverse selection may induce some mismatching of debt maturity and asset maturity when transaction 
costs are significant. When firms have private information regarding the maturity of the firms’ assets, the 
choice of long-term debt is the dominant financing mode to dilute the impact of transaction costs. The 
author models the effects of informational asymmetries concerning asset maturity on the debt maturity 
choice in a very similar concept to endogenous bankruptcy. Firms with investment opportunities that have 
a positive net present value project generating cash flows only at the end of the time period analyzed. The 
theoretical results are supported by the empirical findings.
Berger et al. (2006) analyze panel data on over 6,000 commercial loans to small businesses from 53 
large U.S. banks. They test the implications of Flannery’s (1986) model concerning the effects of risks 
and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity. Berger et al. (2006) find that the low-risk firms 
included in the panel tend to have significantly shorter debt maturities than other firms and these 
maturities tend to increase significantly when informational asymmetries are reduced. The latter result 
also suggests a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in the determination of debt maturity. 
High-risk firms do not have significantly different maturities than intermediate-risk firms. 
As far as the Italian context is concerned, Magri (2006) tests different theories concerning debt 
maturity. The equilibrium share of debt maturity is positively influenced by firm size, tangible assets and 
age. In Italian firms, debt maturity is inversely correlated to leverage. 
RQ4: is there a tax bias in choosing debt maturity?
Since Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) work, tax distortion has been recognized as a determinant of 
capital structure choices. Several authors cited in the previously reported literature have sought a 
definitive conclusion on this issue, but their findings are usually redundant. This paper makes another 
attempt aims to investigate the possible effect of tax distortion and find possible relationships with capital 
structure choices, particularly concerning the connection between firm size and the tax shield value. 
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PROPOSAL OF A MODEL TO SUPPORT CORPORATE DEBT MATURITY POLICIES
The maturity of any funding solution is truly irrelevant only in a very efficient and complete financial 
system. In this case, corporations are simply required to be selectors of investment projects with a positive 
net present value. Then, the financial markets will solve any duration mismatching in cash flows by 
funding the required gap. In analytical terms, this means that the present value of corporate assets equals 
the sum of any contingent financial claim as depicted in equation (1). The only constraint is V>B in order 
to avoid the default zero. ܸ = ܤ + ܵ subordinated to ܸ > ܤ
where: V = the enterprise value; B = the debt value; S = the equity value.
V, B and S are the present values of any possible mix of expected free cash flows satisfying the V>B 
constraint. This means that no special restrictions are required either for cash flows or time maturity as 
explained in equation (2):෍ ܨܥܨܱ௧
(1 + ݇)௧ =௧ ෍ ܨܥܨܦ௧(1 + ݎௗ)௧ +௧ ෍ ܨܥܨܧ௧(1 + ݎ௘)௧௧  ׊ܨܥܨܱ,׊ܨܥܨܦ,׊ܨܥܨܧ ׷ ܸ > ܤ 
where: FCFO denotes the free cash flows from operations, FCFD the cash flows for debt service, and 
FCFE the free cash flows to equity; k = the weighted cost of average capital (WACC); rd = the cost of 
debt capital; re = the cost of equity capital.
Debts are negotiated according to their capability to reduce the cost of capital. Debt maturity is 
irrelevant as the absolute quantity of debt is fixed (at B). The mathematics of this are shown in equation 
(3) in the case of two maturity horizons: 
ܤ =  ෍ ܨܥܨܦ௧
(1 + ݎௗ)௧ = ෍ ܨܥܨܦ௧(1 + ݎ௫)௧ + ෍ ܨܥܨܦ௧൫1 + ݎ௬൯௧ ׊ݔ ׷ ܸ > ܤ and [min(ݎௗ)]௧வ௫௫௧ୀଵ௧
where: rx = the cost of debt capital in the first stage (1< t [U y = the cost of equity capital in the second 
stage (t > x).
I refer to this approach as an extended Modigliani and Miller (M&M) model, as it adds the 
irrelevance of the maturity of debt (i.e., a debt quality component) for the value of corporate investments
to the irrelevance of the quantity of debt (i.e., leverage ratio). According to this approach: (i) the debt 
maturity puzzle is solved by the markets; (ii) transaction costs (including taxes) are irrelevant in relation 
to the capital structure and no maturity arbitrages are given; (iii) the probability of default is exogenous, 
i.e., it is driven only by the business risk that could drive V below B. The cost of debt (rd) is related only 
to the probability of default as reported in equation (4):ݎௗ = ݂[prob(ܸ < ܤ)] =  ݃[var(ܸ)]
where: var(V) is the variance of the value of corporate assets.
Herein, the separation theorem is fully applied: no financial policy can impact the enterprise value. In 
fact, the enterprise value pre-exists any decision, whereas choices about quantities in capital structure 
(i.e., debt-to-equity ratio) and qualitative capital structure decisions (i.e., debt maturity) are driven only by 
arbitrage opportunities (i.e., no impact from adjusting or agency costs). Even corporate size has no 
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
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consequences for capital structure decisions. This is indeed an ideal model, but I shall refer to it in the 
further analysis to focus on the main gaps versus reality.
---§--- 
Market inefficiencies can exert an impact on true capital structure decisions, so the irrelevance of debt 
maturity must be reconsidered, just as in the orthodox M&M approach. Information asymmetries, 
transaction and agency costs, the probability of default and the bargaining power of small companies may 
link business value and debt maturity. 
The case of information asymmetries is the easiest to formalize. Debt funders prefer to add higher 
information risk premia to the cost of debt capital funding less predictable cash flows. The higher risk 
premium in the case of longer maturities (Mantovani 2011) tends to shorten the duration of debt and to 
increase liquidity constraints. Moreover, WACC increases because of the higher embedded risk premium 
and the default probability, a direct consequence of the higher probability of a mismatch between 
corporate cash flow and cash required for the repayment of debt (i.e., FCFO<FCFD). 
Returning to the two maturities model depicted in equation (3) and supposing the second horizon to 
be hit by higher information risk, the value of B is defined by equation (5):
ܤכ = ෍ ܨܥܨܦ௧
(1 + ݎௗכ)௧ = ෍ ܨܥܨܦ௧(1 + ݎ௫)௧ + ෍ ܨܥܨܦ௧(1 + ݎ௬ + ܫܴܲ)௧  ௧வ௫௫௧ୀଵ௧
If the information risk premium (IRP) is positive, *
dr >rd will always be true. Accordingly, the only 
way to compress rd is to reduce the overall debt duration by lightening the weight of the debt of the 
second period. Given a fixed IRP according to a specific level of market risk aversion, the overall 
duration should possibly reduce to the first time horizon. 
This impacts the capital structure, reducing B to the lower B* level, alternatively through: (i) the 
reduction of the quantity of debt (i.e., the B/S ratio) so that V>B* and an optimal default probability is 
restored; (ii) the reduction of debt maturity in order to pay the lowest cost of debt (rdÖrx), but at the same 
time increasing the probability of default generated by a mismatch in cash flow (i.e. FCFO<FCFD) in the 
x-horizon; (iii) payment of higher interest rates in longer maturity debt and a higher probability of default 
due to a mismatch of cash flow on the y horizon. An increase in WACC will follow for all previous 
solutions, together with further impacts due to agency problems. True managerial behavior, such as 
underinvestment, “milking” solutions and efficiency rebounds of corporate operating costs due to the debt 
burden could impact WACC through the emergence of indirect bankruptcy costs. 
The transaction costs could be relevant. A larger dimension of the transaction could dilute the real 
incidence of costs in arranging the negotiation, as some of these costs are unrelated to the total amount 
and are mainly committed to other spent resources, such as time (e.g., legal costs), the number of 
transactions (e.g., fixed taxes), etc. This contributes to the generation of a size-specific capital rationing 
effect that may impact WACC, particularly for SMEs. For these firms specific information asymmetries 
usually contribute to increase the absolute level of transaction costs, increasing even more the previously 
depicted effects over debt maturity.
Company size can determine bargaining power in financial transactions. Bigger companies could 
prefer to obtain short term debt in order to reduce interest payments and to exploit their bargaining power. 
Such bargaining power could be generated by real business performance. Better return-to-risk companies 
could benefit from maturity reduction and even use the debt maturity policy to signal their strength to 
financial markets. 
In terms of equation (4), we conclude that:ܹܣܥܥ = ݂[ݎௗ;  prob(ܸ < ܤכ)] = ݃[ܫܴܲି;  ݔା/ି;  var(ܸ)ା;  ܣ݃݁݊ܿݕା;  ܤି] (6)
(5)
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I refer to this as the Harris and Raviv (H&R) approach as these two authors (in 1991) made a greater 
contribution to resolving the puzzle. 
---§--- 
None of the previous models consider relations between asset volatility and capital structure decisions 
because they assume that default may arise from Var(V), which pushes V below B, and the consequent 
decision of creditors to ask a Court to decree the company in default. Var(V) depicts only the exogenous
sources of the risk of corporate default. In fact, endogenous sources are considered in Leland and Toft’s 
(1996) approach (L&T).  
In their model, endogenous bankruptcy occurs when the shareholders decide to generate a company 
default by aborting the equity contribution to hedge the mismatch in corporate cash flows. This decision 
might arise each time the FCFO is insufficient to cover the due FCFD; the equity owners could avoid 
contributing the difference if the expected corporate return on equity (ROE) is lower than the equity cost 
of capital. Please note that this condition could happen even if V>B (i.e., without the exogenous default 
conditions).
The L&T approach can be formalized in relation to equation (2) considered from the flow-to-equity 
view and supposing that at time t=x the conditions for endogenous bankruptcy are deployed (but V>B):ܵ = ෍ ܨܥܨܧ௧
(1 + ݎ௘)௧ = ෍ ܨܥܨܱ௧(1 + ݇)௧ െ෍ ܨܥܨܦ௧(1 + ݎௗ)௧ =௧௧௧
= ൥෍ ܨܥܨܱ௧
(1 + ݇)௧ + ܨܥܨ ௫ܱ(1 + ݇)௫ + ෍ ܨܥܨܱ௧(1 + ݇)௧ஶ௧ୀ௫ାଵ௫ିଵ௧ୀ଴ ൩ െ ൥෍ ܨܥܨܦ௧(1 + ݎௗ)௧ + ܨܥܨܦ௫(1 + ݎௗ)௫ + ෍ ܨܥܨܦ௧(1 + ݎௗ)௧ஶ௧ୀ௫ାଵ௫ିଵ௧ୀ଴ ൩
New equity capital will flow to the company if and only if equation (8) is satisfied at time x: 
ȟܵ௫ = ܨܥܨܦ௫ െ ܨܥܨ ௫ܱ = ൥ ෍ ȟܨܥܨܱ௧(1 + ݇)௧ஶ௧ୀ௫ାଵ ൩ െ ൥ ෍ ȟܨܥܨܦ௧(1 + ݎௗ)௧ஶ௧ୀ௫ାଵ ൩ = ൥ ෍ ȟܨܥܨܱ௧(1 + ݇)௧ஶ௧ୀ௫ାଵ ൩ െ 0  
Debt maturity design contributes to reducing endogenous bankruptcy because of the control of the 
mismatch in cash flow. The previous equations can be synthesized considering a threshold level of the 
enterprise value (V*) under which the endogenous bankruptcy occurs. Such a value must also be 
compared to the par value of debt (D). If V* is very much below D, as represented in (9), it is possible 
that endogenous default will be avoided: ܸכ < ܸ < ܦ 
In fact, a low level of V* will still incentivize equity owners to fund the company given a certain 
level of debt-to-equity ratio and of debt maturity. Please note that default is avoided even if the potential 
condition (V<D) is deployed, and the longer the debt maturity, the more likely this situation. If the debt 
maturity of D reduces to zero, endogenous bankruptcy could take place even in the case of V>D, should 
the ȴS be insufficient in terms of acquired potential flow to equity as depicted in equation (8).
INSIGHTS INTO DEBT MATURITY: THE ITALIAN CASE
This study tests the actual capability of the above models to detect the determinants of corporate debt 
maturity through an empirical analysis of a sample made up of Italian corporations. The choice of the 
Italian economic system is due to the high incidence of “fully private SMEs” (including family firms) 
within the economic system and the relevance of high growth companies among these. This empirical 
research is constrained by the prescription of the Italian Law, which states that only incorporated 
(9)
(8)
(7)
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companies have to submit their annual financial statements in the Official Public Registry, a regulated 
public database. Sole entrepreneurs and partnerships are not obliged to do so. Nevertheless, for the 
smallest companies, it is mandatory to provide financial statements to the tax authorities, whereas it is 
necessary (only) to disclose statements to banks. Neither tax authorities nor banks can disseminate 
subjective corporate data due to the restrictions of the Italian Data Protection Law; they can only provide 
aggregate data. Very small firms represent a huge quota of Italian entrepreneurial activities, but being 
outside the scope of duties of the Official Public Registry cannot be analyzed hereafter. According to the 
European Law, mandatory financial statements are differentiated in the case of smaller companies, which 
are entitled to deploy simplified annual reports (i.e., short-form) rather than the full report. As per 
corporate liabilities, the short-form statements do not split analytic figures for commercial and financial 
debts. These figures are only indicated in the annex, which is usually not included in the public electronic 
database. When transparently reported, debts are split in terms of their maturities into three categories: 
less than one year, one to five years, and more than five years. As commercial debts usually have shorter 
maturities, the analysis here should not be biased by this limitation in the Official Public Registry 
database.
The sample was sourced from the AIDA Bureax Van Dijck database, which includes the main Italian 
company profiles obtained from the (compulsory) Official Public Registry. The sample was selected 
according to three main characteristics of the companies: (1) they had a turnover in 2009 greater than two 
million euros; (2) they had a continuous track of financial reports for the fiscal years 2005–2009, thus 
including 2008, the year of the financial crisis, to avoid any sample bias due to the crisis; (3) they 
prepared full financial reports in any of the fiscal years considered. No particular restrictions were 
included for manufacturing industries. The resulting sample is made up of 489 companies, each showing 
five figures for any data, i.e., 2,445 observations. This number is small if compared to the total amount of 
Italian companies. The enormous cut in figures is a direct consequence of the condition of having detailed 
financial statements for the entire five-year time horizon, a necessary condition to have data concerning 
the maturity composition of the financial debts.
For each of the 489 companies included in the sample, we focus on the debt maturity structure by 
splitting out the total amount of financial liabilities (TFL) between debts that mature within the next fiscal 
year (TFLST) and those that mature over (TFLLT)
 (1). A synthetic index of the maturity structure of the 
debts is computed according to equation (12):ࢃ = ܶܨܮ௅்ܶܨܮௌ் + ܶܨܮ௅்  
Finally, we compute the survival ratio of the 489 companies according to the inclusion of the 489 
companies in the same database at the end of 2011. At that time, 462 companies from the sample were 
still “active,” while 27 companies (5.52% of the entire sample) were no longer included in the database 
due to liquidation or bankruptcy. The empirical analysis is then conducted by comparing the evolution of 
“W” in the two subsets (462-active and 27-lost) to verify, ex-post, the true potential impacts of the debt 
maturity drivers in the two sets of companies with different survival capabilities. 
RQ1. The Impact of Debt Maturity on the Leverage Ratio 
First, the relation between debt quality (i.e., W) and debt quantity (i.e., L) is examined through a 
simple linear regression for the entire set. To avoid any scale and inflation bias, leverage is considered to 
be the ratio between the total amount of financial debts (TFL) and corporate turnover (REV) as shown in 
equation (13): ࡸ = ܶܨܮܴܧܸ  (13)
(12)
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The choice of this particular configuration of L is also due to the decision to avoid relying on equity 
as it can strongly diverge from its market value, thus biasing the computed leverage. This evidence is 
particularly true when: (i) SMEs have particular relevance in the sample (as in the Italian case); (ii) 
intangibles and human capital can significantly determine the value of shares (as in the case of growing 
SMEs); (iii) accounting principles are fragile in determining the value of growth opportunities (as in the 
European rules).
Table 1 depicts the regression results for the entire sample. The evidence is clear: the extended  
M&M approach seems to be true as no significant relations emerge (R-squared is next to zero). 
TABLE 1
REGRESSION OF W OVER L: RESULTS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Probability
Constant 0.246695 0.013334 1.850.114 0
Slope 0.000125 0.000445 0.281251 0.7786
R-squared 0.000162 Mean dependent variable 0.246986
Adjusted R-squared -0.001891 S.D. dependent variable 0.293691
S.E. of regression 0.293968 Akaike info criterion 0.393392
Sum squared residual 4.208.524 Schwarz criterion 0.410538
Log likelihood -9.418.424 Hannan-Quinn criterion 0.400126
F-statistic 0.079102 Durbin-Watson statistic 1.692.000
Probability (F-statistic) 0.778637
The regressive model in Table 1 is unsupportable: neither the slope coefficient nor the equation as 
whole depict low probabilities of the rejection of results. The evidence depicted in Table I could be biased 
by the methodological choices of the L computation. In fact, companies that generate profits mainly 
through capital gains in their assets (i.e., real estate and building societies) could show a very high L 
index because of low revenues. Within the 489 sample, we observe:
x 12 companies (2.45% of the sample) have LDYHUDJH 
x 50 companies (10.22% of the sample) have 1.00<L<10.00 (average=2.67);
x 57 companies (11.66% of the sample) are unlevered (L=0 and W=0).
Table 2 presents the regression results for the 439 (=489-50) companies for which L<1, the typical 
critical threshold of the leverage ratio that Italian banking practices consider. 
The empirical evidence in the case of Table 2 is also clear, but opposite to that in Table I: strong 
relationships now emerge. Indeed, R-squared is at the 0.13 level and would be even lower (to 0.08) 
should we exclude the L=0/W=0 cases. The supportability of the entire regression now becomes very 
strong; all the probabilities for rejection are zero levelled (the same would occur in the case of the 
exclusion of the L=0/W=0 cases). The evidence from Tables I and II let us conclude that the quantity of 
debt (L) is indeed influenced by maturity quality (W), but this happens mainly in an indirect way. In fact, 
the gap in the supportability of the regressions in the two tables let us conclude that the relationship exists 
only in the case of company profits driven by sales (i.e., those having a higher exogenous bankruptcy 
risk). For those companies with incomes driven by capital gains (i.e., those with higher endogenous risk), 
the relation does not fit.  
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TABLE 2
REGRESSION OF W OVER L: RESULTS FOR L<1
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Probability
Constant 0.131622 0.016506 7.973.931 0
Slope 0.450717 0.05423 8311245 0
R-squared 0.136495 Mean dependent variable 0.222981
Adjusted R-squared 0.134519 S.D. dependent variable 0.277333
S.E. of regression 0.258006 Akaike info criterion 0.132879
Sum squared residual 2.908.987 Schwarz criterion 0.151487
Log likelihood -2.716.698 Hannan-Quinn criterion 0.140221
F-statistic 6907679 Durbin-Watson statistic 1.955.283
Probability (F-statistic) 0
---§--- 
The time evolution of W is then examined for the two subsets. Table 3 depicts the paths of the 
average W together with their standard deviations. 
TABLE 3
TIME PATH OF W
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
462-active subset
average W 46.43% 44.18% 42.06% 50.72% 49.48%
std. deviation 33.84% 33.45% 33.52% 32.51% 32.26%
27-lost subset
average W 50.92% 41.40% 41.68% 45.91% 37.03%
std. deviation 21.03% 28.48% 22.18% 25.99% 23.72%
According to Table 3, the 462-active firms show time-stable weights (W) for long-term financial 
debts. This changes from 46.43% in 2005 to 49.48% in 2009; the standard deviations are constant round 
33%. In the same period, figures of the 27-lost group decreased from 50,92% (i.e., higher than the other 
group) to 37.03% (i.e., considerably lower than the other group). The standard deviations are still stable 
for this second subset, but the level is approximately 22%, i.e., approximately two thirds that of the main 
group. 
All the above data are statistically significant. Such empirical evidence suggests that when a company 
is approaching liquidation, its founders prefer to shorten debt duration, but the stable standard deviations 
(and the gaps between the data of the two subsets) invite further analysis. Table 4 reports more detailed 
descriptive statistics for W evolution over time, showing the frequencies of companies that have increased 
and decreased W values over the entire the time horizon of the analysis; the frequency of companies with 
zero-W evidence is reported separately. The results are unexpected.
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TABLE 4
SAMPLE AND SUB-SAMPLE STATISTICS
    Set
active lost Complete
A Increasing W corporations 117 9 126
% 25.32% 33.33% 25.77%
B Reducing W corporations 161 5 166
% 34.85% 18.52% 33.95%
C Zero W corporations 123 7 130
% 26.62% 25.93% 26.58%
B+C Short-term maturity-based corporations 284 12 296
% 61.47% 44.44% 60.53%
D Corporations with insufficient data 61 6 67
% 13.20% 22.22% 13.70%
Total 462 27 489
The 462-active group includes 61 companies (13.20%) that did not declare enough data to complete 
the computations and are thus excluded from the analysis. The remaining 401 companies include 123 
companies (26.62%) that had no long-term debt at all (W=0), 161 companies (34.85%) that reduced W in 
the five-year period, and 117 companies (25.31%) that increased the relative weight of long-term debt in 
the 2005–2009 period. 
The 27-lost group includes six companies (22.22%) that did not declare enough data to complete the 
computations and thus are excluded from the analysis. For the remaining 21 companies, seven firms 
(25.93%) had no long-term debt at all, five companies (18.52%) reduced W, and nine companies 
(33.33%) increased the relative weight of long-term debt. 
Statistics for the two subsets show clear homogeneous evidence only for the no long-debt companies 
(26.62% vs. 25.93%). Hence, it is intriguing to observe that the “active” group has a higher frequency of 
W-decreasing companies (34.85% vs. 18.52%). Furthermore, the 27-lost group reports a higher frequency 
of W-increasing companies (33.33% vs. 25.31%). The overall evidence is then redundant as the 
frequencies in Table 4 do not prove the time evolution of average-W in the two subsets as reported in 
Table 2 (showing the opposite average trend). This means that there is something more related to the 
impending disappearance of the company that may impact the maturity choices actually adopted by these 
firms.
---§--- 
As a third point in the capital structure puzzle, proposition II in the M&M model is verified. A 
regression between W and the ROE and the tax burden at the corporate level (W) was run, but gives no 
significant results. 
RQ2. The Impact of Debt Maturity on Corporate Performance
According to the endogenous bankruptcy hypothesis, the longer the debt maturity the stronger the 
corporate performance should be. In fact, longer maturity should entitle companies to engage in long-term 
investments, i.e., those with higher return-to-risk ratios. Moreover, longer maturity allows duration 
matching between operative cash flows and those of debt servicing. Such a prescription is coherent with 
the average statistics of the 27-lost subset, as reported in Table 4: the reduced weight of long-term debt 
for such companies may indeed anticipate their exit from the database by 2011. However, the conclusions 
of the same model are not consistent with the evidence from the frequencies: Why can one third of them 
increase the W quota? The explanation might be found in those theoretical approaches suggesting that 
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strongly performing companies prefer to shorten their debt maturity to reduce the cost of debt capital and 
to negotiate new bank relationships at their convenience.
This is why we investigate the relationships between the relative weight of long-term debt and the 
business performance for the entire sample according to three performance indicators:
- The return on capital (ROC), computed as the ratio between the operative income (EBIT) and the 
operative invested capital, net of the commercial debts. We deduct the commercial debts from the 
operative invested capital to detect the amount of capital requirements to be funded by equity and 
financial debts. In the Italian case, the working capital strongly increases the need for operative 
capital (on average, it doubles financial needs), and commercial debts have strong relevance in 
hedging working capital absorption;
- The return on sales (ROS), computed as the ratio between operative income (EBIT) and corporate 
revenues. This indicator is less dependent on the accounting standards adopted by the company to 
compute the operative investments. Moreover, better than others, it lets us understand the business 
model of the company at the commercial level (i.e., without considering capital rotation). The 
reduction in ROS should indicate more liquid (i.e., short-term) financial requirements;
- The added value per worker (AVW), computed as the ratio between the company added value (being 
the EBITDA plus the cost of wages) and the number of people employed in the company. Such an 
indicator contributes to better understanding of the “value for money” of the production proposed by 
the business model of the company. The higher the AVW the longer should be the duration of the 
investments.
All of these being one-period indicators, the results are controlled using the evidence concerning the 
growth ratio of revenues for the entire five-year period, i.e., 2005–2009. 
Table 5a shows statistics for the 27-lost companies. For each of the three clusters reported in Table 5, 
it reports the frequency of companies according to the number of improved indicators. The 27-lost group 
seems to support the extended M&M approach: half the companies that allow W computation do not 
improve on any performance indicator (11 to 21). The same is the case for firms with insufficient data (3 
to 6).
TABLE 5
STATISTICS ON LONG-TERM CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
5a the "27-lost" sub-sample
# of increased performance indicators
0 1 at least 1 2 3 27-lost
A Increasing W corporations 6 3 1 1 1 9
% 22.22% 11.11% 3.70% 3.70% 3.70% 33.33%
B Reducing W corporations 2 3 1 2 0 5
% 7.41% 11.11% 3.70% 7.41% 0.00% 18.52%
C Zero W corporations 3 4 2 0 2 7
% 11.11% 14.81% 7.41% 0.00% 7.41% 25.93%
B+C Short-term maturity-based corporations 5 7 3 2 2 12
% 18.52% 25.93% 11.11% 7.41% 7.41% 44.44%
D Corporations with insufficient data 3 3 1 2 0 6
% 11.11% 11.11% 3.70% 7.41% 0.00% 22.22%
Total
14 13 5 5 3 27
51.85% 48.15% 18.52% 18.52% 11.11% 100.00%
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5b the "active" sub-sample
    # of increased performance indicators sample
0 1 at least 1 2 3 active
A Increasing W corporations 21 96 39 28 29 117
% 4.55% 20.78% 8.44% 6.06% 6.28% 25.32%
B Reducing W corporations 35 126 55 37 34 161
% 7.58% 27.27% 11.90% 8.01% 7.36% 34.85%
C Zero W corporations 25 98 44 31 23 123
% 5.41% 21.21% 9.52% 6.71% 4.98% 26.62%
B+C Short-term maturity-based corporations 60 224 99 68 57 284
% 12.99% 48.48% 21.43% 14.72% 12.34% 61.47%
D Corporations with insufficient data 19 42 23 13 6 61
% 4.11% 9.09% 4.98% 2.81% 1.30% 13.20%
Total
100 362 161 109 92 462
21.65% 78.35% 34.85% 23.59% 19.91% 100.00%
A more careful analysis of Table 5 shows clear, but unexpected, evidence for this subset: operating 
performance is related to debt maturity… but in the opposite direction than expected by the endogenous 
bankruptcy hypothesis! In fact, (i) the worst performing companies (i.e., those that do not improve on 
indicators) are mainly concentrated in the W-increasing group (6 to 11); (ii) 10 companies with increased 
performance typically reject long-term debt (4 companies) or reduce it (6 companies). This second point 
proves the alternative theory stating that shorter debt maturities are chosen in the case of stronger 
operative performance due to the higher bargaining power of such companies in the financial markets.
In Table 5b, the frequency of companies improving on at least one indicator is 78.35%. The reduced 
incidence of the declining performance firms (21.65%) is consistent with the survival constraint used to 
choose the group. Other aspects of the empirical evidence are of interest:
- 82.05% of the 117 companies increasing debt maturity (i.e., 96 firms) improve their operating 
performance during the period 2005–2009;
- 78.26% of the 161 companies decreasing debt maturity (i.e., 126 firms) improve their operating 
performance in the same period;
- 79.67% of the 123 companies with no long-term debt (i.e., 98 firms) improve their operating 
performance in the same period;
- 68.85% of the 61 companies with insufficient data to compute W (i.e., 42 firms) improve their 
operating performance in the period analyzed.
The 462-active subset seems to support the L&T approach: the best performers tend to increase their 
debt maturity to support the sustainability of their business model. However, information risk due to 
disclosure strategies (Bagnoli and Mantovani 2013) emerges: unclear reports reduce the opportunity to 
acquire long-term debt. According to Bagnoli and Mantovani (2012), information risk is higher in the 
case of strong growth opportunities. This is why the information risk bias is controlled in Table 4, 
splitting the results in Table 5 according to the growing ratios of revenues.
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TABLE 6
GROWTH RATIO OF REVENUES
462-active group 27-lost group
'+W '-W '+W '-W
average five-year growth 29.21% 17.58% 13.11% 18.44%
Frequency of growth… # % # % # % # %
<0% 21 17.95% 57 20.07% 5 55.56% 2 16.67%
0–20% 59 50.43% 139 48.94% 1 11.11% 6 50.00%
25–50% 14 11.97% 44 15.49% 2 22.22% 3 25.00%
50–100% 12 10.26% 27 9.51% 1 11.11% 1 8.33%
>100% 9 7.69% 12 4.23% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
n.c. 2 1.71% 5 1.76% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
total 117 100.00% 284 100.00% 9 100.00% 12 100.00%
The five-year average growth of the 462-active subset is higher for the W-increasing companies, 
outperforming the W-decreasing firms (29.21% average growth vs. 17.51%). This result is expected, but 
unexpectedly, the opposite emerges in the 27-lost subset (13.11% vs. 18.44%). This evidence suggests a 
fourth theoretical approach to explain W policies: increasing debt maturity is a way to reduce default 
probability… and to shift the endogenous bankruptcy choice from equity to debt! This is an 
unexpected use of the L&T proposal but very consistent with the evidence in the previous tables, 
particularly as far as the following are concerned: (i) the redundancy of the frequencies in Table 4 vs. the 
time evolution of average W reported in Table 2; (ii) the results in Table 5a concerning the worst 
performing companies in the 27-lost subset, which increase W, thus inverting the relation between debt 
maturity and operating performance.
RQ3. The Relation Between Company Size and Debt Maturity 
Table 7 reports statistics related to the company dimension vs. changes in W.
TABLE 7
SIZE DIMENSION OF THE SAMPLE
462-active group 27-lost group
'+W '-W '+W '-W
Revenues # % # % # % # %
EUR 2–10 million 51 43.59% 102 35.92% 5 55.56% 4 33.33%
EUR 10–25 million 37 31.62% 94 33.10% 3 33.33% 7 58.33%
EUR 25–50 million 14 11.97% 42 14.79% 1 11.11% 1 8.33%
over EUR 50 million 15 12.82% 46 16.20% 0.00% 0.00%
Total 117 100.00% 284 100.00% 9 100.00% 12 100.00%
The evidence is particularly strong: W-increasing companies are mainly SMEs (i.e., with annual 
revenues lower than 25 million euros). In the 462-active group 75.21% of the 117 W-increasing 
companies are SMEs (i.e., 88 units); micro-firms (with annual revenues of less than 10 million euros) 
comprise 43.59%. The incidence of SMEs in the W-reducing companies is 69.01% (196 units vs. 284), 
while micro-firms represent 35.92%. Similar results can be found in the 27-lost subset, with eight SMEs 
increasing W for a subset of nine units and 11 SMES decreasing W for a subset of 12 units. 
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The huge number of small companies per capita that have recourse to longer debt maturity is not 
proved by the capital flow figures. Table 8 compares average W computed for the entire 489 sample by 
weighting either the absolute company frequency or the relative debt capital figures.
TABLE 8
W EVOLUTION IN THE FIVE YEARS OF ANALYSIS
W
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Capital average 48.88% 50.43% 42.04% 44.02% 46.70%
Per capita average 29.76% 28.99% 30.37% 29.30% 29.19%
The evidence is clear: The long term trend of W is similar, but higher flows of long-term debts are 
allocated to large companies even if the (per capita) number of contracts is more diffused in small 
companies. This evidence suggests a couple of conclusions: (i) the transaction costs of financial contracts 
over-impact the convenience of negotiating longer maturity debts; (ii) the Italian case depicts a clear 
crowding-out effect in the capital allocation of longer maturity debt between SMEs and other larger 
companies. Both conclusions can be proved by the concentration curve of both short maturity (TFL_BT) 
and long maturity (TFL_MLT) debts in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1
CONCENTRATION OF CORPORATE DEBTS
The high concentration of short maturity debt confirms the impact of transaction costs diverting 
capital from SMEs; meanwhile the even higher concentration of long maturity debt supports the 
crowding-out effect that benefits bigger companies. At this point, the quest is to find out whether such a 
concentration is due market inefficiencies (transaction costs matter) or to performance gaps (performance 
opportunities, like growth, matter). The first case should confirm the extended M&M approach, whereas 
the second would support the L&T approach. 
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Table 9 depicts the average W for the different clusters of ROC for the entire 489 sample. The table is 
based on the persistency of ROC: the threshold level is required to be reported for any of the five fiscal 
years in 2005–2009.
TABLE 9
W EVOLUTION VS. CORPORATE ROC
Section 1: per capita average W
  # average 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sample 489 29.6% 29.8% 29.2% 30.4% 29.3% 29.2%
ROC>8% 51 27.8% 29.2% 25.7% 27.8% 27.9% 28.6%
ROC>5% 87 26.6% 26.9% 25.9% 26.9% 25.6% 27.6%
ROC>3% 123 28.8% 29.2% 26.9% 28.8% 27.6% 31.3%
ROC>0% 237 29.1% 30.6% 28.5% 29.9% 27.3% 29.0%
ROC<0% 37 24.8% 24.7% 24.6% 29.3% 23.8% 21.3%
Section 2: capital weight average W
  # average 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sample 489 46.4% 46.7% 44.0% 42.0% 50.4% 48.9%
ROC>8% 51 18.9% 17.9% 22.7% 18.1% 16.9% 18.8%
ROC>5% 87 25.1% 23.6% 22.5% 29.8% 27.8% 21.7%
ROC>3% 123 40.1% 40.8% 34.5% 37.0% 41.7% 46.6%
ROC>0% 237 42.1% 41.3% 35.9% 37.3% 45.8% 50.0%
ROC<0% 37 53.7% 42.0% 62.1% 77.4% 71.7% 15.5%
In section I of Table 9, the level of (frequency-averaged)W is independent of ROC, while in section 
II, the level of (capital-averaged)W is strongly dependent on ROC. The relationship is negative: the 
higher the ROC, the lower W. This evidence supports the hypothesis of stronger bargaining power for 
high ROC companies that prefer to divert to short maturity debt, thus gaining flexibility and reducing the 
cost of debt. Gaps in the figures reported in the two sections confirm that bigger companies are those with 
higher bargaining power. Long maturity debt is accessible for SMEs with high levels of persistent ROC, 
but no opportunities to negotiate a lower cost of debt capital are allowed through short-term debt. This 
supports the hypothesis of endogenous bankruptcy being driven by the debt owners. 
Table 10 depicts the average W for the different clusters of growth for the entire sample.
In this table, opposite results are shown in the two sections. The figures of the frequency-averaged W 
reported in section I are lower than those of the capital-averaged W reported in section II. This evidence 
supports the point that growing opportunities are mainly financed through long maturity debt only in 
bigger companies. For SMEs, growing opportunities are mainly funded through short-term debt, possibly 
to control the agency and information costs that may arise. At the same time, high-growth SMEs have 
short maturity debt that increases their probability of default and of endogenous bankruptcy driven by 
debt capital.
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TABLE 10
W EVOLUTION VS. CORPORATE GROWTH
Section 1: per capita average W
  # average 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
g>0% 81 37.9% 35.2% 32.9% 41.6% 39.9% 40.0%
g>3% 55 37.0% 34.0% 34.2% 44.2% 36.1% 36.7%
g>5% 49 34.2% 30.8% 31.2% 42.0% 31.1% 36.0%
g>10% 31 30.8% 25.6% 28.4% 40.2% 25.4% 34.3%
g>15% 19 35.7% 34.0% 35.7% 43.0% 25.4% 40.3%
g>100% (except 2009) 3 59.6% 51.8% 53.7% 56.6% 56.4% 79.3%
Section 2: capital weight average W
  # average 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
g>0% 81 59.3% 52.4% 56.1% 66.6% 61.3% 60.2%
g>3% 55 55.6% 52.7% 54.6% 70.1% 64.1% 63.1%
g>5% 49 70.5% 65.4% 56.7% 73.2% 68.7% 66.6%
g>10% 31 55.6% 65.9% 30.6% 60.6% 61.1% 60.0%
g>15% 19 70.5% 82.7% 34.0% 76.7% 79.0% 80.4%
g>100% (except 2009) 3 79.1% 79.3% 80.5% 73.6% 83.1% 78.9%
Cross-analyzing the results of Table 10 and Table 11 allows us to develop further conclusions. It is 
well known that companies with high growth opportunities usually have lower current returns (i.e., the 
higher “g” the lower ROC and vice-versa). These companies require long maturity funding to avoid 
duration mismatching between assets and liabilities, and reduce the probability of default. The Italian case 
depicts an inefficient market due to the corporate dimension:
- SMEs with high ROC (and lower “g”?) are forced to fund through long maturity debt and pay 
higher interest rates, whereas those with high “g” are forced to fund through short maturity debt. 
In both cases, endogenous bankruptcy is driven by debt capital;
- Bigger companies can always benefit from their bargaining power, both in the case of low ROC 
and low “g,” through obtaining longer maturities. In both cases, endogenous bankruptcy 
conforms to the classic L&T model or is perhaps forced by shareholders.
The common source of this inefficiency is simple: the Italian debt market is lazy in detecting 
affordable growth ratios and the persistency of corporate performance (Mantovani, 2014).
RQ4. Tax Shields and Debt Maturity Policies
The Italian case is very special in terms of corporate taxation, which is why it could be of interest to 
learn from its empirical evidence. The tax burden at the corporate level is very high. The nominal 
corporate tax rate is 27.5% (the legal corporate tax rate since 2008; previously it was 33%), but the real 
tax rate is usually considerably higher. The gap between the real and nominal tax rate is due to a very 
complex system of computing taxable incomes. This system aims to prevent companies deducting costs 
that are unrelated to the core business, but the convoluted system produces a real increase in the tax 
burden. This is why the ratio between the taxes exposed in profit and loss sheets and corporate earnings 
before tax is usually higher than 27.5%. 
94     Journal of Accounting and Finance Vol. 15(3) 2015
Two Italian tax rules contribute to increasing the real tax rate still further:
1. IRAP taxation. IRAP is a special 3.9% tax (since 2008; previously 4.25%) that is added to the 
ordinary Italian corporate tax. What is very particular (indeed, astonishing) is the taxable income 
for computing the IRAP tax: the sum of EBIT and paid wages. IRAP is a tax designed to 
discourage leveraging, but is in essence a tax on the cost of workers and thus may produce tax 
burdens even in the case of company losses.
2. The anti-thin capitalization rule. This rule prevents companies deducting huge amount of paid 
interest for tax purposes by fixing the maximum amount at 30% of ROL (computed as the sum of 
EBITDA and the paid leases). This rule has been introduced mainly to discourage leveraging, 
especially in SMEs.
The distortion of the system is intuitive: the tax burden becomes high and volatile. It therefore 
presents an extraordinary ground to verify any relationship between the tax burden and debt maturity. 
Table 11 depicts the average value of W for corporations with a five-year average tax burden higher than 
33% (i.e., greater than the sum of the average corporate tax rate and the average IRAP tax rate).
TABLE 11
W EVOLUTION VS. TAX BURDEN
Sample Average 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Average W
full-489
46.41% 48.9% 50.4% 42.0% 44.0% 46.7%
Average W 45.87% 69.51% 40.03% 87.64% 4.27% 27.90%
Average W
t >33% - 176
33.13% 38.0% 37.3% 28.1% 33.7% 28.5%
Average W 71.73% 80.95% 69.69% 64.63% 70.03% 73.36%
The evidence confirms the theory: In the 176 subset of higher tax-burdened firms (i.e., greater than 
33%) the W level is persistently below the average. The results in Table 11 could be biased by the anti-
thin capitalization rule. Here, interest deduction is to be considered similar to a put option having a strike 
price at 30% of the ROL (Mantovani 1996). This suggests controlling the dynamics of W according to an 
index of capacity (IC) of interest deduction. The index is computed only for companies with a positive 
ROL according to equation (14):
ܫܥ = ቐ1 െ ூே்଴.ଷήோை௅  if ܫܰܶ ൑ 0.3 ή ܴܱܮ
0 if ܫܰܶ > 0.3 ή ܴܱܮ 
where: INT = paid interests.  
Table 12 shows the average level of W for companies allowing IC computation (484 vs. 489). W 
averages are based both on company frequency (section I) and on capital weight (section II) to control for 
any distortion due to SME data.
The evidence is clear: The higher IC, the lower W, meaning that when companies have the capacity to 
deduct interest, they prefer short maturity debt. No differences are found in the case of SMEs. Two 
comments help to explain this evidence: (i) the IC volatility suggests using short maturity debt as a “pay-
as-you-go” solution to take advantage of the tax shield from debt for any corporate dimension; (ii) a high 
IC is usually generated by high operative returns, i.e., the same driver that shortens debt maturity.  
(14)
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TABLE 12
W EVOLUTION VS. CORPORATE IC INDEX
Section 1: per capita average W
# average 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sample 484 29.6% 29.8% 29.2% 30.5% 29.4% 29.2%
IC=0 42 42.7% 45.1% 41.9% 44.6% 40.1% 41.5%
0<IC<25 73 30.9% 28.6% 31.7% 33.2% 32.4% 28.5%
25<IC<50 89 27.2% 29.5% 26.3% 27.9% 27.0% 25.4%
50<IC<75 97 27.2% 28.2% 28.7% 29.9% 23.7% 25.3%
75<IC<98 117 28.6% 25.5% 26.0% 27.7% 31.0% 32.9%
98<IC<100 33 16.1% 27.9% 13.5% 12.4% 11.3% 15.4%
n.c. 33 28.5% 31.8% 27.4% 25.4% 31.1% 26.6%
Section 2: capital weight average W
# average 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sample 484 46.5% 46.7% 44.1% 42.1% 50.5% 48.9%
IC=0 42 65.2% 73.8% 65.2% 51.7% 65.9% 69.2%
0<IC<25 73 39.0% 41.9% 41.3% 41.1% 41.7% 28.8%
25<IC<50 89 42.8% 37.9% 33.4% 40.3% 50.7% 51.8%
50<IC<75 97 42.7% 31.6% 34.5% 48.7% 47.3% 51.5%
75<IC<98 117 30.5% 36.6% 31.9% 23.6% 31.9% 28.4%
98<IC<100 33 21.3% 7.5% 15.0% 18.6% 16.9% 48.4%
n.c. 33 42.3% 19.3% 61.0% 23.9% 54.9% 52.4%
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The initial aim of the paper was to carry out an empirical check of the Leland and Toft (L&T) model 
using the Italian case. A sample was extracted according to the availability of the entire set of detailed 
financial reports for the period 2005–2009. Two sub-sets were identified, separating out the companies no 
longer included in the source database in 2011. By comparing the results from the two subsets, the study 
sought to find insights that could better contribute to insulating the endogenous bankruptcy phenomena 
proposed by the L&T approach. The emerging complexity of the Italian case suggested deepening the 
analysis to identify a wider number of drivers of debt maturity policies. 
The resulting aim of the paper became the opportunity to find new insights concerning the debt 
maturity puzzle, particularly in the case of unlisted/private companies. The same leverage quantity might 
impact in very different ways according the qualitative profile of the firm in terms of debt maturity. Debt 
maturity can stimulate unexpected impacts over several drivers of the operating performance. The 
endogenous bankruptcy approach is empirically proven, but the concept of endogeneity is to be extended 
to the firm’s stakeholders, particularly long-term funders (banks). This is why the corporate dimension 
matters (i.e., bargaining power) for capital structure decisions that are related to the business model (i.e., 
growth options, current returns, and the value content of corporate products). 
Four points lead us to the following conclusions: 
1. Debt maturity impacts the capital structure choices of private firms. The results suggest that the 
endogenous bankruptcy hypothesis of the L&T approach is confirmed, but they also suggest the 
inversion of the endogenous role, especially for SMEs: the creditors are the inner decision makers 
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of the endogenous default. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests that they are the true crafters 
of the debt maturity to avoid default according to their needs.
2. There is a link between debt maturity and operating performance. According to Harris and Raviv 
(1991), we find that higher operating profitability reduces debt maturity, while higher growth 
ratios support maturity extensions. We conclude that long-term finance can support the value of 
growth opportunities. The inner relief of short debt in Italian banking activity contributes to 
explaining lower persistence in growth ratios. The evidence suggests that no incentives to widen 
maturity exist, even for equity owners of growing companies, as no excess returns emerge in 
ROE.
3. Company size matters. The empirical evidence detects high concentrations of debt capital 
deploying a bargaining advantage for bigger companies due to the impact of the costs of financial 
transactions. Long-term debt is more concentrated than short-term debt. Bigger companies prefer 
to use their bargaining power either to reduce the cost of equity capital or to fund growth 
opportunities at their convenience. Longer debt maturity for SMEs is concentrated in the case of 
higher returns on invested capital. Perhaps banks prefer longer maturity for these very 
competitive companies to avoid expensive continuous negotiation of smaller contracts.
4. The tax shield concept is to be revised according to debt maturity. Longer maturity reduces the 
value of tax shields, ceteris paribus. Surprisingly, the Italian empirical evidence suggests that the 
corporate tax rate is not the inner driver. The index of capacity (IC) of interest deductions is 
instead more relevant. The higher and the more volatile the IC, the higher the tax opportunity to 
reduce debt maturity. In fact, short-term debt use gives the company the required flexibility to 
ride the implied option embedded in the tax shield that is generated from thin capitalization rules. 
The specifics of the Italian case seem to support only some evidence of inefficiency. The Italian debt 
market is redundant as it prefers to allocate longer maturity debt in extreme cases both for SMEs and for 
bigger companies. In the case of SMEs, banks seem to give long maturity credit allowances when (i) the 
endogenous probability of default needs to be reduced, and (ii) the current return is high but growth 
options are not. In the case of bigger companies, the debt allocation primarily reflects the bargaining 
power of the company, whereas less relevance is given to the quality of the investments. Probably, both 
cases suggest that the Italian inefficiency is mainly due to lazy approaches to corporate financial analysis 
and the bulk use of rating instruments that miss the firm-specific determinants of debt maturity. 
Comparing the Italian evidence to other international data on the one hand, and the evidence of listed 
companies on the other hand is then the next research step to gain more insights into the maturity drivers 
of corporate debt.
ENDNOTES
(1) This simplified split is the only possibility in view of the mandatory deployment of financial statements by 
Italian law.
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